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Abstract
Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic
management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and
empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of
choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the
absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are
equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of
positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when
market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become
necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure.
The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a
synthesis of agency and transaction cost perspectives.
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The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial
Ownership versus other Methods of Vertical Integration
Although economists and strategic management researchers recognize that there are many
possible motives for vertical integration (Perry, 1989; Harrigan, 1983), there has not been a
systematic synthesis of the considerable body of literature in the field of industrial organization
and strategy on this important strategic option (Kumpe & Bolwijn, 1988). A unified conceptual
framework is a particularly important foundation for further research from a strategic
management perspective, since this field draws its strength from integrative research approaches
(Bowman, 1990; Huff, 1981; Jemison, 1981; Mahoney 1991a). This paper therefore suggests a
general theory for predicting and prescribing vertical financial ownership that integrates and
extends previous work done under both the strategy and industrial organization paradigms.
Inherent in the concept of vertical financial ownership is the elimination of contractual or
market exchanges and the substitution of internal transfers within the boundaries of the firm via
internal development or merger. The disadvantages of vertical financial ownership suggest that
corporate strategy research should examine more carefully the alternative governance structures of
vertical integration (Williamson, 1990). The vertical integration strategy may be implemented by
a continuum of governance structures which include spot markets, short-term contracts, long-
term contracts, networks, franchising, joint ventures, and vertical financial ownership (hierarchy).
The second section of the paper illustrates the isomorphic nature of vertical integration via
contracting compared with vertical financial ownership. It is proposed as a general theorem that
every motive for vertical financial ownership may be achieved alternatively by an appropriate
vertical contract, when agency and transactions costs are assumed to be absent. Indeed, in the
absence of transaction costs, vertical contracting can replicate the advantages of vertical
financial ownership. Thus, most theories of vertical financial ownership that have been provided
in the literature are described more accurately as theories of vertical integration strategy. They
provide us with no guidance concerning the appropriateness of vertical financial ownership
relative to vertical contracting. We are still left with the task of predicting and prescribing
organizational form. Put differently, the formulation of vertical integration strategies (Harrigan,
1984) needs to be supplanted by a more general discussion of governance structures to effectively
implement corporate objectives. The last section of the paper advances a general theory for
explaining and predicting the pattern of vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting in
different environments which draws on an integrated transaction cost and agency theory
perspective.
The Advantages of Vertical Integration Strategy
An exhaustive review of the economic and strategy literature (Mahoney, 1989) suggests
that the motives for vertical integration may be classified into four major categories: (1)
transaction cost considerations; (2) strategic considerations; (3) output and/or input price
advantages; and (4) uncertainties in costs and/or prices. While no firm will be motivated by all of
these potential advantages, taken as a whole they illustrate the broad utility of this corporate
option, a usefulness that justifies greater theoretical and empirical attention than has been given to
vertical integration to date. The second half of the paper examines the first category of
transaction cost considerations. In this section we consider other motives that allegedly explain
vertical financial ownership, per se.
Strategic Considerations . The firm may achieve strategic advantages via vertical
financial ownership. Vertical financial ownership is frequently cited, for example, as a means of
increasing barriers to entry (Parsons & Ray 1975) and foreclosing competitors (Hamilton & Lee,
1978; Salinger, 1988). Vertical financial ownership may also be used to raise rival's costs by
reducing the number of suppliers (Ordover, Saloner & Salop, 1990). Moreover, when entry into
two separate stages of production is already difficult because of large capital requirements,
combining successive stages will further raise entry barriers, because new entrants must enter two
stages rather than one (Comanor, 1967). Vertical financial ownership has the potential
disadvantage of also being a major source of exit barriers (Harrigan 1985b), but exit barriers
themselves may play a compensating positive role if they constitute additional barriers against
prospective entrants (Porter, 1980).
A motive related to entry barriers is the strategy of "price squeezing" (Joskow, 1985b).
Vertical financial ownership may enable a firm to eliminate competition by lowering the price of
the output while simultaneously raising the price of the input. Edwards (1953) contends, for
example, that the price of crude oil was raised and the price of gasoline was lowered to such a
degree via vertical financial ownership that the independent refiner could not operate. Adams
(1964) similarly argues that the large integrated steel companies utilized a price squeeze to
eliminate smaller, less integrated competitors. McNicol (1975) provides a related example of
"quantity discrimination" resulting in a "supply squeeze" of independent fabricators.
Vertical financial ownership may be used strategically not only in an environment of
intense competition, but in regulated environments as well. If a firm is subject to effective rate-
of- return regulation in the final stage of production but is permitted to integrate backward, for
example, it may be able to avoid the effect of the regulatory constraint by transfer pricing the
intermediate product above marginal cost (Dayan, 1975).
Vertical financial ownership can even promote oligopoly by improving the monitoring
necessary to maintain coordination. Adelman (1972) suggests that vertical merger into refining by
the highly concentrated crude oil suppliers enhanced stability of coordination by making it more
difficult for an oligopolist to plan secretly to increase market share. Since there were few
significant independent refiners, no company could increase its output of crude oil without first
building refineries and distribution systems which clearly signaled their plans to competitors.
Vertical financial ownership thus may evolve as a means of maintaining oligopolistic discipline
and may provide mobility barriers (Caves & Porter, 1977) which sustain the stability of strategic
groups (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Newman, 1978). Differences between existing firms in their
degree of vertical financial ownership appear to have led to difficulties in agreement on the
desirable vertical price structure. Even more problematic, changes in vertical financial ownership
can increase the threat of entry as it has in steel (Adams & Dirlam, 1964), petroleum (de Chazeau
& Kahn, 1959), and aluminum (Stuckey, 1983).
Output and Input Price Discrepancies . If output and input prices are not given to the
firm, then there are several possible explanations for vertical financial ownership. In the
successive monopoly case, Spengler (1950) considers a product that passes through three successive
stages of production before being ready for sale to consumers. Each stage of production contains
sufficient monopoly power to charge a price above the competitive level. Here, a vertically
integrated firm controlling all three stages of production can earn a larger profit than can be
obtained by the "myopic chain monopoly" (Greenhut & Ohta, 1976). The essential idea is that the
vertically integrated producer can evade the monopoly prices imposed by upstream firms.
In the case of bilateral monopoly (Machlup and Taber, 1960), vertical financial ownership
facilitates arriving at the input choice consistent with joint profit maximization under non-
integrated bilateral monopoly. A "fundamental transformation" (Williamson, 1985) where firms
become "locked in" to a vertical relationship is not uncommon (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978).
Vertical financial ownership minimizes appropriation risk (Barney, 1986; Walker, 1988).
In the case of an upstream monopoly, if there exists a variable-proportions technology
(Warren-Boulton, 1978) that allows a mixing of input levels in producing the final product,
vertical merger permits the integrated firm to achieve efficiency in resource utilization (Hay,
1973; Quirmbach, 1986). As a first approximation these cost savings accrue as additional profits
to the integrating monopolist (Mallela & Nahata, 1980; McGee & Bassett, 1976; Schmalensee,
1973; Vernon & Graham, 1971; Waterson, 1982). Abiru (1988) extends this stream of literature to
include the more empirically relevant case of variable-proportions technology and successive
oligopolies. Vertical financial ownership, under plausible conditions, leads to efficiency at the
retail level (Dixit, 1983) and lower retail prices to consumers (Perry & Groff, 1985).
The price discrimination incentives for vertical financial ownership can be elucidated by the
example of an intermediate good monopolist selling to two downstream competitive industries.
The upstream monopolist can increase profits by selling the intermediate product at a lower price
to the downstream firm with the relatively higher price sensitivity (Perry, 1978). Vertical merger
by the upstream monopolist can eliminate incentives for arbitrage of the intermediate product
between the downstream firms (Gould, 1977; Romano, 1988). Perry (1980) contends that forward
integration by Alcoa in the period 1888-1930 was inspired by price discrimination. Alcoa
integrated into the relatively more price sensitive markets, such as cookware (Hale, 1967; Wallace,
1937).
Crandall (1968) submits that Ford's expansion into competitive components markets
similarly was motivated by the desire to price discriminate. Ford purchased Auto-Lites battery
plant and obtained more revenue from those who used their vehicle the most (Weintraub, 1949).
Asset specificity of parts and economies of scale in producing repair parts also tend to lock
customers in with an automobile manufacturer.
Uncertain Costs and Prices . Vertical financial ownership is a potential response to the
stochastic elements confronting the firm. Uncertainty can take many forms: parametric or
structural (Langlois, 1984); perceptual or market based (Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975);
volume, measurement, quality or technological (Williamson, 1985). In the absence of any of these
uncertainties, the firm need not exist (Coase, 1937; Knight, 1921). As uncertainty increases, not
only is the firm called into existence, there are increasing arguments for expanding the scope of
organizational activity through vertical financial ownership. More specifically, the same
arguments found in the basic theory of the firm (Coase, 1988b; Demsetz, 1988; Masten, 1988) can
be utilized to justify vertical financial ownership (Williamson, 1975). Indeed, any theory that
explains the necessity of vertical financial ownership is, of course, a theory of the firm.
Arrow (1975) examines uncertainty in the supply price of the upstream good by focusing on
asymmetric information between parties at the upstream and downstream stages. A downstream
firm has the incentive to purchase one or more upstream firms because this improves its pricing
forecast and thus its ability to purchase the appropriate level of capital. Carlton (1979) presents a
similar model in which both output and input firms face uncertainty in demand and firms must
make decisions concerning price and production before actual demand is observable. In this case
there is some risk of supply failure to the customer as well as risk to the seller of overproduction.
Vertical financial ownership is a means of transferring this risk. Firms integrate to ensure a
supply of input for their "high probability" demand and continue to purchase their "low
probability" demand.
Green (1986) presents a model in which the price in the intermediate market is fixed so
that fluctuations in external demand for the intermediate product results in rationing of either
upstream or downstream firms. Vertical financial ownership allows the combined firm to avoid
rationing, and thus avoid demand uncertainty due to fluctuations in purchasing behavior by
upstream or downstream firms (Bernhardt, 1977).
While the strategy literature tends to agree on many of the potential advantages of vertical
financial ownership that have been given more detailed attention in the organizational economics
literature, two points of apparent disagreement concern demand uncertainty and technological
uncertainty. It is a time honored tradition in the economics literature to argue that vertical
financial ownership is motivated by the attempt to assure supply (Dennison, 1939; Flugge, 1929;
Frank, 1925; Jewkes, 1930; Willoughby, 1901) and to avoid the risk of foreclosure of markets
(Allen, 1971; Grimm & Harris, 1983). Several empirical studies have supported the hypothesis
that demand or volume uncertainty leads to increased vertical financial ownership (Anderson &
Schmittlein, 1984; Levy, 1985; Walker & Weber, 1984, 1987). Levin (1981) finds, for example,
that vertical merger into crude production for oil refining in the 1948-1972 period reduced the
variance of profits. Chatterjee, Lubatkin and Schoenecker (1989) find that vertical financial
ownership reduces the systematic risk of the firm. Helfat and Teece (1987) find that vertical
financial ownership reduced uncertainty as measured by Beta in the CAPM model. Recent work
in the strategy field by Harrigan (1985a, 1986) however, yielded a negative relationship between
demand uncertainty and vertical financial ownership. D'Aveni and Ilinitch (1990) find that fully
integrated firms have higher systematic and bankruptcy risk in the forest products industry.
I submit that the Williamsonian view that uncertainty leads to greater vertical financial
ownership and the Harrigan view that uncertainty leads to less vertical financial ownership can be
reconciled. Williamson's statement is a conventional comparative statics argument that if the level
of asset specificity remains constant , then an increase in uncertainty increases the likelihood of
vertical financial ownership. Harrigan, on the other hand, is analyzing the effect of uncertainty
in a dynamic contingency framework that incorporates the dimensions of stages, breadth, degree
and form of integration. To translate Harrigan's view in Williamson's terms: an increase in
uncertainty may lead a firm to utilize less firm-specific assets. In consequence, less vertical
financial ownership would obtain in the long-run. But this does not contradict Williamson, who
only argues that vertical financial ownership will increase (under uncertainty) if asset specificity
remains constant.
Vertical financial ownership may also be an adaptive response to the agency problems of
measurement uncertainty (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). In particular, shirking problems in team
production induces vertical financial ownership (Jones, 1984). When output depends on joint
efforts, individuals have the incentive to "free- ride" in hopes of receiving greater reward than
their efforts would otherwise dictate. Empirical studies are consistent with the hypothesis that
measurement uncertainty of this type leads to vertical financial ownership (Anderson &
Schmittlein, 1984; Anderson, 1985).
Measurement uncertainty and quality uncertainty are also important factors that lead to
performance ambiguity (Jones, 1987). The need to reduce quality uncertainty for key inputs may
spur backward integration, while the need to assure point-of-sale service, which is often critical
for new products, may necessitate forward integration (Harrigan, 1986).
Finally, the problem of technological uncertainty (Hennart, 1982) and the trading of
technological knowledge may lead to vertical financial ownership (Arrow, 1971). Here again an
apparent disagreement can be found in the literature. Armour and Teece (1980) argue that the
strong relationship between research intensity and vertical financial ownership in the petroleum
industry was due to market failures in information exchange. However, Harrigan (1986) and
Walker & Weber (1984, 1987) find that technological uncertainty was associated with less vertical
financial ownership. The resolution of apparent disagreement here requires care to not confound
asset specificity and uncertainty (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984). If technological uncertainty
leads to the utilization of more flexible (less firm-specific or product-specific) technologies, a
link suggested by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt's (1986) model, then less vertical financial
ownership obtains.
The problems of recognition, disclosure, team organization and dissipation that are
involved in contracting under technological uncertainty all suggest a decision of vertical financial
ownership (Caves, 1982; Teece, 1982). The effect of technological uncertainty on vertical
financial ownership may be especially influenced by the coordination costs of contracting for
many parts in a system. Monteverde and Teece (1982) argue that the automobile electrical system
involved substantial interdependencies and were consequently produced in- house. The Walker
and Weber (1984, 1987) automobile studies could be updated to consider these system coordination
influences on the technological uncertainty—vertical financial ownership linkage.
In summary, uncertainty may take many forms and the various types of uncertainty considered
here may have differential impacts on the make-or-buy decision. Moreover, even the assessment
of the effects of a particular type of uncertainty on the choice of governance structure is
problematic. For example, the dynamic effect of demand uncertainty on the choice of vertical
financial ownership or vertical contract is theoretically indeterminate. Furthermore, empirical
evidence has provided mixed results. However, one thing is certain. To determine the effect of
uncertainty on the choice of organizational form, empirical studies must take into account positive
agency and transaction costs. Indeed, in the absence of transaction costs, uncertainty has no
impact on governance structure. Even more generally, in the absence of transaction costs, every
motive for vertical financial ownership may be achieved equally well by a vertical contract. The
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validity of this fundamental Coasian (1988a) insight is rigorously demonstrated in the following
section.
The Isomorphic Nature of Vertical
Financial Ownership and Vertical Contracting
Most of the published theoretical articles considered in the preceding section claim to be
providing explanations for vertical financial ownership. It is important to realize, however, that
this assertion is often misleading. While motives provide explanations for vertical integration
strategy they do not provide insight on the choice of organizational form (governance structure).
In short, when we abstract from transaction costs, knowing the motive for vertical integration
cannot help us in predicting or prescribing organizational form. Conversely, knowing the
organizational form cannot help us to infer motive (Phillips & Mahoney, 1985). Hence, many
economic papers that claim to provide theories of vertical mergers actually provide theories of
vertical integration strategy. The choice of governance structure to implement the vertical
integration strategy remains unspecified.
It now will be demonstrated that vertical contracting (i.e. exclusive dealing, resale price
maintenance, exclusive territories, etc.) is a viable alternative to vertical financial ownership. In
fact, in the absence of transaction costs, vertical contracting can replicate the advantages of
vertical financial ownership. This fundamental idea is a variation of the "Coase theorem" (Coase,
1988a). The key argument is that the various motives provided for vertical financial ownership,
derived from the competitive strategy and economics literature, can be directly generalized to
become arguments for vertical integration and applied inter alia to long-term contracts (Crocker &
Masten, 1988), networking, and equity joint ventures.
To illustrate the "Coase theorem" that much of the literature on vertical financial
ownership can be read in the more general terms of vertical integration, research on vertical
financial ownership is matched with literature discussing other forms of vertical integration in
Table 1 . A necessary difference between alternative forms of vertical integration is the
transaction costs involved. Table 1 thus ignores transaction costs, but considers the other motives
for explaining vertical financial ownership.
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 1 suggests, for example, that vertical financial ownership is not the only way of
creating entry barriers. Exclusive territories, exclusive dealer arrangements, long-term contracts
and vertical price-fixing (resale price maintenance) may be used as strategic entry barriers
(Aghion & Bolton, 1987; Comanor & Freeh, 1985) in ways that are very similar to the protection
created by vertical financial ownership. In both cases, firms monopolize the downstream (or
upstream) market and thus raise rival's costs (Krattenmaker & Salop, 1986; Salop & Scheffman,
1983).
The regulated firm similarly need not have full vertical financial ownership to avoid rate-
of-return regulation. Transfer pricing via quasi-integration would suffice (Blois, 1972). If
vertical integration is needed to maintain an oligopolistic pricing arrangement, tying contracts
have been expressly used for this purpose (Burstein, 1960a).
Moving to input and/or output price discrepancies as a motive for vertical integration,
alternative vertical constraints such as exclusive territories, exclusive dealing, franchise fees,
resale price maintenance and/or forcing tie-in purchases also may be used to maintain control.
The general argument is that promotional efforts, determination of final price, and uses of
technology are important decisions frequently made by the downstream firm (retailer) that
influence the profitability of the upstream firm (manufacturer). The upstream firm has a strong
incentive to control the downstream firm's decisions, but this control can be achieved in many
ways.
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In the successive monopoly case, a franchise fee or resale price maintenance, where the
manufacturer mandates that the dealer cannot exceed the profit-maximizing price, replicates the
vertical financial ownership outcome (Blair & Kaserman, 1983; Rey & Tirole, 1986). In the case
of bilateral monopoly, Machlup and Taber (1960) argued that if two separate firms bargain about
price and quantity, they could achieve joint profit maximization without vertical financial
ownership being required. Burstein (1960a) explored the variable proportions incentive for
vertical integration and argued that the upstream monopolist could obtain identical results by
tying the purchase of the nonmonopolized substitute inputs to the purchase of the intermediate
product over which the monopolist has control.
Price discrimination could be achieved by tying arrangements rather than vertical financial
ownership (Blair & Kaserman, 1983; Burstein 1960b). For example, companies have tied staplers
to stapling machines, rivets to riveting machines, computer cards to computers, and paper supplies
to electrofax copying machines (Blackstone, 1975). Territorial restrictions coupled with resale
price maintenance could also facilitate price discrimination (Phillips & Mahoney, 1985). The
final key advantage comes from uncertainties about costs and/or prices. In the case of asymmetric
upstream information (Arrow, 1975) auxiliary markets might convey the information without
vertical financial ownership. Arrow assumes, however, that upstream producers will have severe
difficulties in selling information, which may or may not hold true empirically. Second, he
assumes that a forward-contract cannot be written that would enable downstream firms to make
correct investment decisions (Teece, 1980).
In the Carlton (1979) model the analysis of vertical integration explicitly refers to either
long-term contract or vertical financial ownership. Thus, in Carlton's view, the desire to shed
risk by itself does not provide a powerful incentive for vertical financial ownership. Firms
concerned with the supply of an input (Walker & Weber, 1984) could write contracts which
include a large penalty such as holding "hostages" (Williamson, 1983), collateral (Benjamin, 1978),
or deferred rebates, performance bonds and liquidated damage provisions (Goldberg, 1979; Klein
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& Leffler, 1981; Telser, 1980).
In terms of product quality and service, Harrigan (1986) persuasively argues that new
pioneering products and high quality differentiated products require vertical financial ownership
to insure that quality is maintained through the linkages of the value-added chain (Anderson &
Coughlan, 1987). A manufacturer can use forward integration to differentiate her product by
providing a higher level of service at the distribution level than would an independent distributor
(Coughlan, 1985; Etgar, 1978). However, manufacturers of new products frequently use vertical
contracts to achieve the same objective. For example, the manufacturer may use exclusive
territories or resale price maintenance to achieve high quality service. By reducing price
competition, the manufacturer induces the retailers to compete on service and other nonprice
terms. Vertical price-fixing contracts (Shepard, 1990) between the manufacturer and retailers
mitigates free-rider problems (Goldberg, 1984; Oster, 1984; Telser, 1960) by eliminating
discounters and enabling the manufacturer to signal quality via retail endorsement (Klein &
Murphy, 1988; Marvel & McCafferty, 1984). This seems to have been the rationale explaining
resale price maintenance for high quality products such as Lenox china and Magnavox televisions
(Goldberg, 1982), Sony electronics, Florsheim shoes, and London Fog and Misty Harbor raincoats
(Overstreet, 1983).
Similarly, exclusive territories and resale price maintenance provide incentives for retailers to
offer services to the customer on behalf of the manufacturer, and exclusive dealing provides
incentives for the manufacturer to undertake promotional services that benefit the retailers
(Marvel, 1982). In short, the problem of shirking (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jones, 1984) may be
solved by vertical (relational) contracting (Williamson, 1979) as well as by vertical financial
ownership.
Researchers have maintained that vertical financial ownership is an institutional response
to technological uncertainty (Teece, 1982), to the difficulty of trading information (Arrow, 1971),
and to "internalize externalities" such as R & D spillovers (Phillips, 1983). Vertical financial
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ownership also is suggested as a means of protecting value-creating aspects of proprietary
products or process technology (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). However, internal organization may
not be necessary to alleviate these problems. Joint ventures, for example, are often a sufficient
organizational response to minimize the difficulties inherent in technology transfer (Hennart,
1988a; Kogut, 1988).
In summary, this section has recapitulated the motives described in the previous section and
has demonstrated that for each motive, a vertical contract may replicate the advantages of vertical
financial ownership. In the following section it is suggested that this is a fundamental proposition
that may be derived from mathematical principal-agent models.
The Two Branches of Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) define agency costs as the sum of monitoring expenditures by
the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. Transaction costs
concern both ex ante and ex post costs of contracting. Specifically, ex ante costs include: (1)
search and information costs; (2) drafting, bargaining and decision costs; and (3) safeguarding an
agreement. Ex post costs of contracting include: (1) monitoring and enforcement costs; (2)
adaptation and haggling costs; (3) bonding costs; and (4) maladaptation costs (Williamson, 1985).
For the purposes of this paper, positive agency costs are considered to be a subset of transaction
costs. The similarities between positive agency costs and ex post transaction costs are, after all,
transparent. While the basic unit of analysis of agency theory concerns the incentive and
measurement problems of the individual . transaction cost analysis stresses the attributes of the
transaction . The thesis of this paper is that measurement costs and transaction costs should be
considered simultaneously for the purpose of predicting organizational form.
The insight on the complementarity of vertical financial ownership and vertical
contracting can be expressed in terms of agency theory. It is useful to consider two "separate
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branches of agency theory" (Jensen, 1983); namely mathematical principal-agent models (Rey &
Tirole, 1986) and positive agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Oviatt,
1988). It is argued here that the two branches do not belong to the same tree. Hence, the fact
that conversation between scholars of the two branches is minimal (Jensen, 1983) is hardly a
puzzle. While positive agency theory fits comfortably within the conversation of organizational
economics (Barney & Ouchi, 1986), as suggested in the previous paragraph, the mathematical
principal-agent models may be more appropriately classified as a distinct paradigm.
Mathematical principal-agent models assume unbounded rationality of agents and no
differential costs between long-term contracts and hierarchy. Indeed, the firm is a "nexus of
contracts" in which the continuum of governance structures is compressed to a single point. That
organizational form is inconsequential in such models is hardly surprising. To translate these
models in transaction cost terms, one may argue that these mathematical models rigorously
demonstrate that in the absence of bounded rationality and transaction costs, firms are
superfluous. The alignment of ex ante incentives, via contracting, suffice. Organizational
economists (Barney & Ouchi, 1986) are sensitive to the fact that while the "nexus of contracts" lens
highlights and reveals salient organizational problems, it also blurs and neglects the distinctive
features of real world firms (Williamson, 1990). Economists that take the "nexus of contracts"
metaphor of organizations literally have taken the apparatus to its logical absurdity.
Principal-agent models convincingly demonstrate that a vertical contract can always be written
to achieve the vertical financial ownership outcome (Evans & Grossman, 1983) when we ignore
the problems of bounded rationality and transaction costs. Or put differently, mathematical
principal-agent models provide rigorous demonstrations of the "Coase theorem". In fact, vertical
contracts represent one of the most obvious applications of principal-agent theory (Bonanno &
Vickers, 1988; Mathewson & Winter, 1984; Rey & Tirole, 1986).
It is ironic, to say the least, that many economists refer to this fictional world of zero
transaction costs as a "Coasian world". To set things right, Coase notes that (1988a: 174):
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"Nothing could be further from the truth. It is a world of modern economic theory, on which I
was hoping to persuade economists to leave". The dominance of principal-agent theorists and
game- theorists in current mainstream industrial organization research suggest that Coase's
recommendation has been strongly resisted in the economics profession.
On the other hand, evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982), positive agency theory
(Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1990) take
seriously the proposition that organizational form does matter. Barney and Ouchi (1986) coined
the term "organizational economics" which aptly describes the branch of economics that considers
the real "Coasian world" of bounded rationality and evolutionary reductions in positive agency and
transaction costs via improved organizational arrangements. The purpose of the Coase theorem
was not to provide a license to ignore transaction costs and hence organizational form, but rather
to seriously consider the impact of positive transaction costs on institutional arrangements. It is
scarcely surprising that organizational economic theories are more familiar (relevant) to the
management researcher than current mainstream industrial organization. After all, one should
hardly expect that business school researchers would adopt abstract theories which claim that
organizational form does not matter. Furthermore, contingent claims contracting and its
offspring the principal-agent model provide pie in the sky. Managers need intellectual
nourishment here and now. Frequently, the results of deductive contingent claims contracting
models are not backed by executable algorithms. To put it bluntly, they are a worthless currency.
In the market for ideas, management researchers are not buying, and rightly so. Putting forth
such theories to our most important audience, the sophisticated business professional (Schendel,
1990), would be folly.
With the exception of a small group of organizational economists, the concept of transaction
costs is largely absent from current economic theory. Furthermore, the hostility toward the
assumption of bounded rationality in the upper echelons of the economics profession rivals their
reaction toward monopoly. It is the thesis of this paper that within a world of zero transaction
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costs and unbounded rationality it is logically impossible to understand the working of our
organizations, to understand the problem of choosing a governance structure for vertical
integration, or to have a basis for determining procurement policy. The remainder of the paper
considers positive agency and transaction costs for determining organizational form. The
argument, to this point, suggests that a focus on these costs is logically compelling.
The Advantages of Vertical Financial Ownership
The governance structure chosen to implement the vertical integration strategy is often
chosen to minimize the cost of negotiating, adapting, monitoring, and enforcing buyer-supplier
relationships (Coase, 1988b). A good example of the potential cost savings of vertical financial
ownership is the avoidance of sales taxes when arms-length contracting is replaced by internal
transfers (Coase, 1937). More subtly, vertically integrated petroleum firms have found it
profitable to increase the price of crude oil relative to the price of final products in order to shift
as much of their reported earnings as possible to the raw materials extraction stage, which enjoys
tax preferences associated with resource depletion (Bolch & Damon, 1978). Similar results can be
found in other basic conversion industries such as copper, aluminum and steel (Scherer & Ross
1990).
A fundamental motive for various institutional arrangements is the failure of markets to
satisfactorily handle certain transactions (Casson, 1984). Important sources of market failures
include externalities (Dahlman, 1979), increasing returns and sunk costs (Baumol, Panzar & Willig,
1982) and market imperfections (Yao, 1988). These market frictions violate the standard
assumptions of competitive equilibrium models. Prices are no longer sufficient statistics. Long-
term relational contracts (Masten & Crocker, 1985; Mulherin, 1986; Wiggins & Libecap, 1985),
impartition policies (Barreyre, 1988), tapered and quasi- integration (Porter, 1980), joint ventures
(Harrigan, 1988), franchising (John, 1984; Norton, 1988; Rubin, 1978), networks (Jarillo, 1988:
Thorelli, 1986), quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981), hybrids (Borys & Jemison, 1989), and "vertical
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financial ownership" (Flaherty, 1981) are some of the "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson,
1985) which emerged in response to the inadequacies of "classical market contracting" (Macneil,
1980). The generalizable thesis of the transaction cost literature is that the particular institution
(governance structure) chosen to implement the strategy of vertical integration mainly serves
efficiency purposes (Bork, 1978; Williamson, 1985).
Williamson's (1985) seminal research develops a well-grounded theoretical framework for
explaining and predicting this market failure. The basic idea is that contractual difficulties arise
when opportunistic agents (Anderson, 1988; Maitland, Byrson & Van De Ven, 1985; Provan &
Skinner, 1989)) engage in frequent transactions in an environment of sufficient uncertainty
and/or complexity to surpass bounded rationality capabilities (Simon, 1978). The risk of self-
interested agents utilizing asymmetric information to their advantage is high in such environments
and vertical financial ownership is one response to this inadequacy of classical market contracting.
Contractual problems become acute when there are small numbers bargaining, a situation that
occurs when transactions involve human, physical or site "asset specificity" (Spiller, 1985;
Williamson, 1979). Human asset specificity involves uniquely related learning processes or
teamwork. Physical asset specificity includes requirements for specialized machine tools and
equipment. Site specificity occurs when unique locational advantages exist, as, for example, when
a power plant is located near a coal mine to save on transportation costs (Joskow, 1985a). Vertical
financial ownership can assure requisite inputs in such situations and the importance of asset
specificity in explaining and predicting vertical financial ownership is supported by a large body
of literature including case studies (Alston & Gillespie, 1989; Butler & Carney, 1983; Globerman
& Schwindt, 1986; Goldberg & Erickson, 1987; Hennart 1988b; Klein, 1988; Palay, 1984; Teece,
1976), formal modeling (Kleindorfer & Knieps, 1982; Masten, 1982; Riordan & Williamson, 1985)
and statistical testing (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Armour & Teece, 1980; Caves & Bradburd,
1988; Heide & John, 1988; John & Weitz, 1988; Jones, 1987; Joskow, 1985a; Levy, 1985;
MacDonald, 1985; MacMillan, Hambrick & Pennings, 1986; Masten, 1984; Masten, Meehan &
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Snyder, 1989; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1984, 1987; Walker & Poppo, 1990).
A review and critique of the empirical literature "on vertical integration may be found in Mahoney
(1991c).
A last important transaction cost motive for vertical integration involves economies of
scope (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982; Williamson, 1975), including technological
complementarities (Bain, 1968). The standard example of vertical financial ownership to achieve
economies of scope is found in the integration of iron and steel production (Lavington, 1927;
Mancke, 1972). An example of major technological interdependency can be found between
equipment manufacturing and operations in the telecommunications industry (Phillips, 1983).
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) maintain that economies of scope are a sufficient condition for
vertical financial ownership. However, as Teece (1980) has emphasized, economies of scope do
not explain the "scope of the enterprise". Transaction cost theory suggests specific advantages of
vertical financial ownership, per se. Advantages include, but are not limited to, the following:
( 1
)
Profit Vertical financial ownership may most effectively achieve the profit
incentive since preemptive claims on profits between separate firms are eliminated.
(2) Coordination and Control. The firm has better control of opportunistic behavior due
to the authority relationship (Dow, 1987) within the firm. Managers of the divisions can be
required to cooperate in an adaptive manner and promotions can be adjusted to achieve such
behavior. Furthermore, disputes may be settled more effectively internally, rather than through
litigation.
(3) Audit and Resource Allocation. Contrary to the claims of Grossman and Hart (1986),
the auditing powers of the firm are superior to the auditing capabilities of contracting parties
(Williamson, 1975). The differential improvement of auditing by merged firms relative to
auditing by railroad cartels is illustrative (Chandler, 1977). A firm has the legal right to audit its
divisions but no right to audit outside contractors. Integrated firms have superior information
upon which they can base allocations to their divisions so that the incentive for those divisions to
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use their information strategically (to the detriment of the enterprise's profits) is eliminated
(Crocker, 1983). Furthermore, improved information enables the firm to allocate personnel to
tasks more effectively.
(4) Motivation. A fourth advantage of the vertically integrated firm comes from the
quasi-moral involvement that may develop within its boundaries. Particularly successful
organizations inculcate an ungroundable but vital sense of human solidarity, and these clan- like
emotions can have positive productivity impacts (Ouchi, 1980). Equity and due process develops
in internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and institutional and personal trust relations
evolve. Selection, training, and socialization may minimize the divergence of preferences of team
members (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1980). Convergent expectations reduce behavioral uncertainty
and associations within the boundaries of the organization become valued.
(5) Communication. A fifth advantage of the vertically integrated firm is the
development of a coding system which increases communication efficiencies. The standardization
of language is seen in accounting systems, blueprints, and other reporting systems. Admittedly,
these economies could be obtained via recurrent contracting but the efficiencies of the coding may
be impaired due to the risk of opportunism. Firms are arguably better than markets in
communicating and coding respects because the hazards of opportunism are mitigated due to
superior auditing and greater incentive harmony within firms. The upshot is that firms (within
capacity limits) have an information processing advantage, and this advantage complements
superior auditing capabilities (Sandler & Cauley, 1980). In summary, when a firm vertically
integrates, ownership changes (Grossman & Hart, 1986), incentives change, and governance
structures (ability to monitor and reward) change (Williamson, 1985).
Disadvantages of Vertical Financial Ownership
The suggestion that vertical financial ownership should be chosen due to ownership,
incentive and governance structure advantages, however, lacks a comparative institutional
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assessment. Strategic management researchers, have begun to focus on the implementation
problems of vertical financial ownership and have provided an analysis which is complementary to
the organizational economics literature.
The disadvantages of vertical integration may be classified under three major categories:
(1) bureaucratic costs; (2) strategic costs; and (3) production costs.
Bureaucratic costs . Implementation costs of vertical financial ownership have proved to
have particularly important negative effects, especially because they are so difficult to anticipate.
Vertical merger increases the size of an organization which often results in additional hierarchical
levels. Increasing size and bounded spans of control imply greater distance of most subordinates
from their ultimate superiors. This may lead to communication distortion due to serial
reproduction loss and/or deliberate distortion to achieve divisional objectives (Calvo & Wellisz,
1978; Cremer, 1980; Williamson, 1967) thus obviating a major advantage of vertical financial
ownership.
The loss of high powered market incentives suggests that internal organization may also be
more costly than the market mechanism (Williamson, 1985), undercutting the profit incentive for
integration. One explanation is that the lack of direct competitive pressures on the cost of the
intermediate products may allow increasing levels of slack (Cyert & March, 1963) and thus
reduce profitability. Even if outside sources exist as a potential disciplining influence, they may
be bypassed due to bureaucratic considerations. A norm of reciprocity between divisions easily
develops (Gouldner, 1960), and over time the benefits of reducing transaction costs are lost.
As firms vertically integrate away from the base business, they are also likely to become
involved in new manufacturing or selling tasks. Managing at the manufacturing and distribution
stages requires different skills than previously required by the firms only in upstream or
downstream operations and inexperience may lead to comparatively high internal costs (Harrigan,
1985c). In short, the synergies created through vertical financial ownership may be overestimated
and do not compensate for higher costs (Buzzell, 1983).
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Strategic costs . While Arrow (1975) suggested that vertical financial ownership may eliminate
the problem of asymmetric information, the flip side of the argument has been suggested by
Harrigan (1984), namely that vertical financial ownership may result in a loss of access to
information and tacit knowledge as relationships with experienced and more broadly based
distributorships are severed. A second potential strategic cost to vertical integration is that the
firm purchases specialized assets that increase sunk costs and may lead to chronic excess capacity
and low profitability (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974). Third, vertical integration may decrease a
firm's strategic flexibility and lead to high exit barriers (Harrigan, 1985d). Moreover,
psychological commitment (Staw & Ross, 1978) and administrative difficulties of divestment
(Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985) are important dynamic costs that need to be
considered in the make-or-buy decision.
Production costs . Walker & Weber (1984) suggest that production costs are critical in the
make-or-buy decision. A vertically integrated firm that does not utilize a sufficient amount of
the input to achieve minimum efficient scale will be at a cost disadvantage against firms that
contract out to an efficient supplier achieving full economies of scale (Stigler, 1968). Second,
vertical financial ownership may lead to a capital drain, a potential problem that is particularly
damaging to smaller firms (Williamson, 1975). Third, capacity imbalance in the vertically
integrated firm may lead to higher production costs than incurred by firms that utilize market
mechanisms (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984).
The disadvantages of vertical financial ownership considered here and the advantages of
vertical financial ownership considered in the previous section suggest that rich case histories of
procurement decisions are necessary and should be valued (Temin, 1988). An historical approach
may provide insight on the dynamic change of governance structures over time (North, 1981).
Stigler (1951) suggests a life-cycle theory of vertical financial ownership based on Adam Smith's
(1776) observation that "the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market". Hence,
vertical financial ownership is predicted in the early stages and declining stages of the industry
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life-cycle when demand is low and specialized firms along a value-chain cannot be sustained.
De- integration is predicted in the emerging stage of the industry as demand increases. Empirical
studies have provided mixed support for the life-cycle theory (Etgar, 1977; Levy, 1984).
Detailed historical studies, however, indicate that vertical financial ownership is not merely a
demand side phenomenon and that the predicted de- integration stage frequently does not occur
(Chandler, 1977; Porter & Livesay, 1971; Stuckey, 1983).
Clearly, Stigler's theory lacks consideration of the supply side (transaction costs).
Furthermore, the pattern of vertical financial ownership may be a path dependent (Arthur, 1989)
process. Thus, a firm that starts out highly integrated may develop a bias toward certain kinds of
idiosyncratic process innovations that further reinforce its integrated structure (Langlois &
Robertson, 1989). It is unfortunate that, at present, historical analysis occupies a slum dwelling in
the town of strategic management (Bowman, 1990). The fact that business school researchers have
devalued the historical currency is objectionable because "the past has useful strategic
management" (to paraphrase McCloskey's (1976) brilliant article).
A higher sensitivity toward the inherent value of historical analysis does not mean that
rigorous models that are subject to empirical tests should not also be employed. On the contrary,
the argument here is that the historical and analytical approaches are complementary. In terms of
the second approach, a parsimonious model that may explain and predict the choice of governance
structure is an important task that is developed in the last section of the paper.
A Framework for Predicting Organizational Form
The great insight of Coase (1937) and the subsequent formulizations in the principal-agent
literature demonstrate the theoretical equivalence of vertical contracting and vertical financial
ownership when transaction costs are presumed to be absent (Cheung, 1983; Katz, 1989; Riordan,
1990). Conversely, in order to predict and prescribe organizational form from an efficiency
perspective, the necessity of analyzing positive agency and transaction costs is undeniable. In
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fact, if one accepts the premise that the environment selects out those firms that use relatively
efficient governance structures (Nelson & Winter, 1982), then the conclusion that transaction costs
critically determine organizational form is not an "assertion" (Pfeffer, 1982) at all. It is, in fact, a
tautology.
This is not to say that transaction cost theory cannot be challenged or criticized. The
conclusion that transaction costs determine organizational form, may be challenged by questioning
the premise that environmental selection processes are efficacious (Perrow, 1986); to the extent
that they are not effective, power and politics may be operative (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In
fact, recent empirical research suggests that in the case of the adoption of the multidivisional
structure both efficiency and power politics matter (Mahoney, 1991b; Palmer, Friedland,
Jennings, & Powers, 1987). While recognizing the legitimacy of alternative theoretical
perspectives and the inevitable limitations inherent in relying on one "conceptual lens" (Allison,
1971), this paper nonetheless, pushes hard on the efficiency orientation to predict organizational
form.
However, even those that grant the premise that efficiency considerations determine
organizational form, have criticized transaction cost theory and positive agency theory
perspectives for a lack of dimensionalizations and operationalizations of such costs. While
criticism of this kind was warranted in the late 1970's, such criticism in the 1990's is uninformed.
Transactions have been dimensionalized in terms of frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity
(Williamson, 1985: 79).
In the framework, developed below, frequency is not considered critical for the following
reasons: First, as Williamson (1985) notes, when asset specificity is low, frequency does not
influence organizational form. Second, when asset specificity is high, both occasional transactions
and recurrent transactions may require unified governance. While frequency does influence the
choice of governance structure in the case of "intermediate" asset specificity, such refined
predictions are not attempted here.
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The choice of organizational form may be determined then by uncertainty (demand and
technological) and asset specificity (physical, human, site) in the transaction cost model. The
positive agency theory literature (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989) emphasizes the
critical role of measurement uncertainty in determining organizational form. Table 2 summarizes
the extensive subset of the vertical integration literature that deals directly with operationalizing
these agency and transaction cost variables.
Insert Table 2 about here
The transaction cost approach (Williamson, 1979) provides insight into the key role of asset
specificity, but neglects the interactive effects of measurement problems that have been
highlighted by agency theory. On the other hand, positive agency theory emphasizes
measurement costs but neglects asset specificity. Combining these two efficiency perspectives
enables us to make predictions and offer prescriptions on the make-or-buy decision.
The agency perspective emphasizes information asymmetry issues. A significant aspect of
information asymmetry in organizations is the problem of rewarding effort in team production
(Jones, 1984). This leads to the so-called "nonseparability problem" (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
If reward cannot be based on output, a manager is necessary to monitor behavior or effort (Barzel,
1982). A second important agency theory variable concerns knowledge of the transformation
process or task program inability (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). Low task programmability
reduces the effectiveness of monitoring effort. As Table 2 shows, a good deal of the literature on
the vertical integration decision has been concerned with such uncertainties, and the results in
general suggest that as measurement uncertainty increases, vertical financial ownership is
increasingly likely.
The transaction cost approach emphasizes asset specificity as the fundamental variable in
determining the optimal vertical integration strategy (Williamson, 1979). When assets are not
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closely tied to a specific strategy, the theory suggests that market and informal means of
coordination will be preferable corporate strategies. Vertical financial ownership (hierarchy)
makes sense only when assets are idiosyncratic and closely tied to a specific strategy.
The integration of the transaction cost and agency approaches yields task programmability,
nonseparability, demand uncertainty, technological uncertainty and asset specificity as five
determinants of organizational form. Although each of these variables has been operationalized,
no single empirical study has considered all five variables simultaneously.
While not denying the possibility that demand uncertainty and technological uncertainty may
be critical transaction cost variables in predicting organizational form, the earlier discussion of the
Harrigan-Williamson debate suggests that the impact of these variables on organizational form is
theoretically indeterminate. Hence, the parsimonious model presented here considers the
interactive effects of the positive agency costs variables of task programmability and
nonseparability and the transaction costs of asset specificity. To highlight the interactive effects
of these variables, consider each in a dichotomous (low, high) form, as shown in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
This table suggests a synthetic theory of corporate vertical control. Drawing together empirical
evidence from two fields of inquiry—strategy and economics—and applying insights from two
theoretical perspectives- -transaction cost and agency theory— it offers a more integrative
organizational economics (efficiency) approach to the choice of governance structure than
previously available.
In its simplified form, the theoretic perspective can be expressed in eight different
circumstances which might face the corporation. When the output of the individual is easily
measured (low nonseparability) and asset specificity is low (cases 1 and 5), the ease of input
measurement (task programmability) is inconsequential. In both cases, the market mechanism
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(spot market prices) should run smoothly. Vertical financial ownership can add very little to this
scenario; it is unlikely to be considered, and is highly unlikely to be effective. Since asset
specificity is low, the process of competition provides few degrees of freedom for agents to
behave opportunistically. Thus, the price system is the predicted institutional arrangement for
exchange.
When the output of the individual is easily measured (low nonseparability) and asset specificity
is high (cases 2 and 6) a long-term relationship is required for the parties to be willing to invest in
high sunk cost investments (high asset specificity). However, low nonseparability suggests that
hierarchy is not essential (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). The type of long-term relationship chosen
will be influenced by the ability to measure input behavior (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1985). If
task programmability is high (case 6), an equity joint venture that allows a more refined
monitoring system to develop is an effective governance structure. If task programmability is
low (case 2), a long-term contract that stipulates output performance and is enforced by courts is
the predicted organizational choice.
When the output of the individual is difficult to measure (high nonseparability) and asset
specificity is low (cases 3 and 7) a long-term relationship is not required due to low switching
costs or exit barriers (low asset specificity). When task programmability is low (case 3), some
type of relational contract (Macneil, 1980) that inculcates cooperative attitudes is required since
output control and behavioral controls are ineffective as a consequence of high nonseparability
and low task programmability. Cooperation must be achieved by a "private ordering"
(Williamson, 1985) rather than reliance on third-party enforcement.
A situation in which there is low asset specificity (i.e. near perfect labor markets), high
nonseparability and high task programmability (case 7) precisely describes the conditions posited
by Alchian & Demsetz (1972). Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that the "inside-contract" system is
the real world governance structure that most resembles the Alchian & Demsetz (1972) "manager
as monitor" model. A detailed historical analysis of the inside-contracting system may be found
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in Mahoney (1989).
When individual output is difficult to measure (high nonseparability) and asset specificity is
high (cases 4 and 8), contractual problems become acute. The scenario of high task
programmability, high asset specificity, and high nonseparability (case 8) are the classical
conditions which indicate that vertical financial ownership (hierarchy) is the preferred governance
mode (Williamson, 1985). However, when task programmability is low (case 4) we have a worst
case scenario in which asset specificity is high and input and output measurements are ineffective.
Ouchi (1980) prescribes a clan relationship in which trust and human dignity are emphasized and
opportunistic attitudes are transformed in favor of human solidarity. The inculcation of moral
values (such as Adam Smith's concept of "sympathy") and cooperative attitudes are considered a
viable solution to an otherwise intractable economic dilemma.
Conclusion
A great deal of attention has been given to diversification as a basic corporate strategy
(Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). This paper suggests that vertical integration strategy is an
option with similar complexities deserving increased research attention. Recent efforts by
industrial organization and strategic management researchers to expand our theoretical and
empirical understanding of vertical integration (which includes vertical contracting and vertical
financial ownership) has been exciting and fruitful. We have begun to understand complex
phenomena that were ignored or treated as strategic puzzles a decade ago. On the other hand, at
present this work is somewhat disjoint, with individual researchers tending to respond to
increasingly specific debates about the details of different vertical integration scenarios.
The underlying proposition of this paper is that new theoretical insight is most likely to
take place at the interface of the strategy and economics literature and be achieved by more
broadly conceptualizing vertical integration. More specifically, new insights into vertical
integration may be found by considering vertical financial ownership (via internal development
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or merger) as one end of a vertical integration continuum that also includes vertical markets and
vertical contracting. Even more broadly, it has been argued that the theory of vertical financial
ownership and the theory of the firm are isomorphic.
Expanding the horizons of discourse in this way gives us access to a much richer set of
theoretic tools. Insights from the agency literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
the organizational economics literature (Barney & Ouchi, 1986), the property rights literature
(Alchian, 1982; Jones, 1983; Grossman & Hart, 1986) and a dynamic resource-based theory of the
firm (Mahoney & Pandian, 1990; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) become available for enhancing
our knowledge of vertical integration strategy and vertical governance structure.
The key theoretic advance of the paper is achieved by integrating two branches of the
organizational economics literature (Barney & Ouchi, 1986) -- positive agency theory literature
and transactions costs literature. The transactions costs literature has underemphasized
information asymmetries. The agency literature relies on assumptions about information
asymmetries and risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1989) but ignores asset specificity, a topic given
considerable attention in transaction cost analysis. A synthesis of the two efficiency perspectives
is used to predict and prescribe the optimal vertical governance structure. The choice among
organizational forms outlined in the specific model depends upon the degree to which
nonseparable team effort is required, the ability to program tasks and the level of asset specificity.
Each of these variables has been operationalized and an empirical study that utilizes all three
variables is warranted. Different mixes of these variables lead the firm to scenarios that extend
from spot market contracting to vertical financial ownership.
From an efficiency perspective, it has been argued that the influence of positive agency and
transaction costs are undeniable. The empirical questions concern: (1) whether the three
dimensions of transaction costs specified here are "sufficient statistics" for predicting
organizational form; and (2) whether the efficiency orientation alone (even if we added
frequency, demand uncertainty and technological uncertainty dimensions, among others) is
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adequate to predict organizational form. The adequacy of the proposed framework and the
cogency of the efficiency orientation cannot be ascertained by logic; empirical testing is required.
However, within the efficiency conversation , the following argument has been emphasized
throughout the paper In the absence of transaction cost analysis, the prediction of
organizational form is a logical impossibility. While game- theoretic and mathematical principal-
agent models provide all that glitters, I strongly recommend that management research mine the
Coasian gold with Williamsonian tools.
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Table 1
Motives for Vertical Control
Motive Paper suggesting vertical
financial ownership
Paper suggesting
vertical contract
Strategic Considerations
Entry (Bain, 1968) Exclusive Dealing Contracts
Barriers (Porter 1980) (Comanor & Freeh 1985)
Tying contracts
(Whinston, 1990)
Circumvent- (Dayan, 1975)
regulation
Transfer pricing via equity
joint venture (Blois, 1972)
Maintaining (Adams & Dirlam, 1964)
oligopolistic
discipline
Tying contracts or resale
price maintenance
(Burstein, 1960a)
Output and/or Input Price Discrepancies
Successive (Spengler, 1950)
Monopoly (Greenhut & Ohta, 1976)
Franchise fee or resale
price maintenance (Rey
&Tirole, 1986)
Bilateral
Monopoly
(Williamson, 1971) Contract bargaining
(Machlup & Taber, 1960)
Upstream
Monopoly
Price Dis-
crimination
(Vernon and Graham, 1971) Tying contract
(Schmalensee, 1973) (Burstein, 1960a)
(Blair & Kaserman, 1978)
(Crandall, 1968)
(Perry,1980)
Tying contract
(Burstein, 1960b)
(Blackstone, 1975)
Territorial restric-
tions coupled with re-
sale price maintenance
(Phillips & Mahoney,1985)
Uncertainties about Costs and/or Prices
Reduce asym-
metric uncer-
tainty
(Arrow, 1975) Vertical contract
(Teece, 1982)
Reduce or
transfer risk
(Carlton, 1979) Long-term contract
(Carlton, 1979)
Assure
Supply
(Demand
uncertainty)
(Walker & Weber, 1984) Collateral (Benjamin, 1978)
Deferred rebates (Gold-
berg, 1979)
Control
quality and
services
(Harrigan, 1986) Exclusive territories
(Goldberg, 1982)
Resale price main-
tenance (Marvel &
McCafferty, 1984;
Phillips & Mahoney, 1985)
Reduce
shirking
(Measurement
Uncertainty)
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) Relational contract
(Williamson, 1979)
Reduce tech-
nological un-
certainty
(Teece, 1982) Equity joint venture
(Hennart, 1988a)
Appropriate
R&D spill-
overs
(Phillips, 1983) Vertical contracts
(Evans & Grossman, 1983)
Trading of
Technology
(Arrow, 1971) Equity joint venture
(Kogut, 1988)
Table 2
Empirical Research on the Vertical Integration Decision
Study/Sample/
Methodology
Measures (vertical
integration {VI},
uncertainty {U}, &
asset specificity {AS}
Results
Anderson &
Schmittlein
(1984)
16 electronic
component
manufacturers
Survey data
Logit analysis
VI
U
AS
use of direct
sales force
expected deviation
between forecast and
actual sales in the
next year, expressed
as a percentage
{volume uncertainty}
the likelihood of
perceived difficulty
of measuring the
results of individual
salespeople equitably
{measurement uncer-
tainty)
average of six (stand-
ardized) variables
representing manager's
perceptions of the
importance of human
capital specificity
Volume uncertainty
had no statistically
significant effect
on the likelihood
of vertical integra-
tion.
Measurement uncer-
tainty increased
vertical integra-
tion at a statisti-
cally significant
level.
Asset specificity
increased the like-
lihood of the adoption
of the vertical
integration strategy
at a statistically sig-
nificant level.
Anderson
(1985)
13 electronic
component
manufacturers
Survey data
Logit analysis
VI
u
AS
use of direct
sales force
difficulty of
evaluating
performance
{measurement
uncertainty}
Company specificity
and brand-specific
know-how required.
The more difficult
it was to evaluate
sales performance
the greater the like-
lihood of vertical
integration
(statistically sig-
nicant).
The greater the
human capital asset
specificity the
higher the like-
lihood of vertical
integration
(statistically
significant).
Armour &
Teece
(1980)
U.S.petroleum
industry for
the 1954-1975
period
Regression
analysis
VI
AS
number of
primary
production
stages
firm's
expenditure
on basic,
applied, or
development
research
Vertical integration
is significantly
associated (at the
95 % level) with
basic and applied
research expenditures.
Human capital asset
specificity of
technological know-
how necessitates
vertical integration.
Caves &
Bradburd
(1988)
83 U.S.
Industries
for 1975
Regression
analysis
VI
AS
input-output
measure on the
distribution of
each industry's
shipments among
other industries
(a) joint fewness
of sellers & buyers
(b) capital inten-
sity that is poten-
tially sunk and
specific to the
industry
Small numbers
bargaining and
firm-specific
sunk capital were
positively assoc-
iated with vertical
integration at a
positive and
statistically
significant level.
Harrigan
(1986)
192 firms
from 16
industries
from 1960-
1981
Chi-square
tests
VI
U
measures of
degree, stages,
breadth and
form of VI
changes in sales
growth
{volume uncertainty}
years to obsol-
esce technology
{technological
uncertainty}
Both volume
uncertainty and
technological
uncertainty led
to less vertical
integration at a
statistically
significant level
John & Weitz VI
(1988)
87 industrial AS
good firms
Survey data U
Regression analysis
Logit analysis
percent sold Vertical inte-
directly to gration was
end users positively and
human capital significantly
asset specificity related to asset
specificity and
environmental un-
average response of certainty.
5 items including
industry, market Production costs
share, and sales were not stat-
forecasting volatil- istically signif-
ity icant.
utility While 85% of
ownership the coal used
of mines to generate
electricity is
mine- mouth supplied by the
plants which market mechanism,
involved site virtually all of
specificity, the mine-mouth
physical asset mines are owned
specificity and by utilities
dedicated assets
Joskow
(1985)
277 observations
of contracts or
complete owner-
ship by coal-
burning electric
generating
plants
VI
AS
Levy
(1985)
69 firms
representing
37 different
industries
for the years,
1958, 1963,
1967, 1972
regression
analysis
VI
U
AS
value-added/sales
(enterprise- based census)
log of firms sales
regressed on a time
trend, the variance
of the error term is
used as a measure of
uncertainty
small numbers of firms
and the intensity of
research and development
expenditures
Volume uncertainty,
fewness of firms,
and research inten-
sity each increased
the likelihood of
vertical integration
at a statistically
significant level
MacDonald
(1985)
79 three and
four digit
producer goods
industries for
1977
regression
analysis
VI
AS
the proportion of ship-
ments from manufactur-
ing industries that are
made to affiliated units
{U.S. Census of Manu-
facturers}
small numbers (high buyer
or seller concentration)
capital intensity, which
is measured by the ratio
of fixed assets to ship-
ments
The use of vertical
integration is more
prevalent in capital
intensive industries
and in those four digit
characterized by
high levels of
buyer or seller
concentration at
a statistically
significant level
MacMillan .
Hambrick .
&
Pennings
(1986)
178 consumer
99 capital
275 component
businesses
regression
analysis
VI
U
AS
(1 -purchases/costs of
goods sold)
Four-year mean absolute
deviation of served
market sales from served
market growth rate
Gross book value of
plant and equipment
per dollar of revenues
Volume instability
led to an increased
likelihood of
backward integration
for consumer, capital,
and component
supplier businesses at
a statistically
significant level.
Asset specificity/
capital intensity
increased the like-
lihood of backward
integration for
consumer, capital,
and component
supplier businesses at
a statistically
significant level.
Masten
(1984)
1,887 component
specifications
for the aero-
space industry
Maximum
Likelihood
procedure
VI
U
AS
make or buy
survey data
if the component
is highly
complex
if the component
is highly
specialized
Components that
were complex and
specialized were
more likely to
be made in-house
at a statistically
significant level.
Monteverde
& Teece
(1982)
Ford &
General
Motors
for 1976,
133 auto
components
probit
analysis
VI
AS
80 percent or more
of the component
requirements produced
in-house
amount of engineering
effort required in
designing a part
part made specifically
for a single assembler
Backward integration
was more likely
when the engineering
effort required to
design a part was
high, suggesting
the importance of
human capital
human capital asset
specificity.
Backward integration
was also more likely
when the parts were
firm-specific.
Walker &
Weber
(1984; 1987)
60 components
of an auto-
mobile manu-
facturer
LISREL estima-
tion using un-
weighted least
squares
VI
U
make or buy decision
Volume uncertainty
(a) expected volume
fluctuations
(b) uncertainty of
volume estimates
Technological uncertainty
(a) frequency of changes
in product specifica-
tions
(b) probability of tech-
nological improve-
ments
High volume uncer-
tainty leads to a
make decision in
low competition
(but not high
competition) markets
Technological
uncertainty has no
influence on make-or
buy decisions when
supplier competition
is low but leads to a
buy decision when
competition is high.
Only the results relevant to the relationship between asset specificity, uncertainty and the
adoption of vertical integration are briefly summarized here. For details, see the original
references.
Table 3
Predicting the Organizational Form of Vertical Control
Low Non-
separability
High Non-
separability
Low Task Programmability High Task Programmability
Low High Low High
Specificity Specificity Specificity Specificity
1: spot
market
2: long-term
contract
5: spot
market
6: joint
venture
3: relational
contract
4: clan
(hierarchy)
7: inside
contract
8: hierarchy
Definitions:
Low task programmability: Observing input (effort) is a poor measure for
making rewards.
High nonseparability: Observing output is a poor measure for making rewards.
High specificity: Human, physical and/or site firm-specific investments are high.
Spot market: The price system works smoothly.
Long-term contract Obligations of principals and agents are specified and enforced by
third-parties (courts)
Relational contract Obligations of principals and agents are specified and
self-enforced. Social conditioning is applicable.
Inside contract A hybrid arrangement between contract and hierarchy that is best described
as a "manager as monitor" setup.
Joint ventures: An equity agreement whereby a separate entity is created.
Hierarchy: A superior-subordinate relationship; financial ownership.
Clan: Organization that is based on a vital sense of human solidarity.
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